Testing limited environmental liability
against human rights requirements. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2009 by Gouritin, Armelle
IES WORKING PAPER  3/2009
Testing limited environmental liability
against human rights requirements
Armelle Gouritin
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing limited environmental liability 
against human rights requirements 
 
 
 
Armelle Gouritin  
 
 
 
 
    
 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be published without 
the permission of the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute for European Studies (IES) is a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. The IES 
operates as an autonomous department of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). It hosts 
advanced Master programmes and focuses on interdisciplinary research in European Studies, 
in particular on the role of the EU in the international setting. Within this scope, the IES 
also provides academic services to scholars, policy makers and the general public.  
The IES Working Paper Series is a collection of scientific articles on policy-relevant issues 
that deal with the EU in its international context. The Series reaches across multiple 
disciplines, including law, political sciences, social sciences and economics. Instructions for 
sending Working Paper submissions as well as comments may be found at the Working Paper 
Series’ homepage (see www.ies.be).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN Number: pending 
© Armelle Gouritin  
Institute for European Studies, VUB 
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
Questions regarding oil spills remain high on the political agenda. Legal scholars, legislators 
as well as the international, European and national Courts struggle to determine key issues, 
such as who is to be held liable for oil spills, under which conditions and for which damage. 
The international regime on oil spills was meant to establish an “equilibrium” between the 
needs of the victims (being compensated for their harm) and the needs of the economic 
actors (being able to continue their activities). There is, however, a constantly increasing 
array of legal scholars’ work that criticizes the regime. Indeed, the victims of a recent oil 
spill, the Erika, have tried to escape the international regime on oil spills and to rely 
instead on the provisions of national criminal law or EC waste legislation. In parallel, the EC 
legislator has questioned the sufficiency of the international regime, as it has started 
preparing legislative acts of its own. One can in fact wonder whether challenging the 
international liability regime with the European Convention on Human Rights could prove to 
be a way forward, both for the EC regulators as well as the victims of oil spills. This paper 
claims that the right to property, as enshrined in Article P1-1 of the Human Rights 
Convention, could be used to challenge the limited environmental liability provisions of the 
international frameworks.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Questions regarding oil spills remain high on the political agenda.1 Legal scholars, 
legislators as well as the international, European and national Courts struggle to determine 
key issues, such as who is to be held liable for oil spills, under which conditions and for 
which damage.  
The international regime on civil liability for oil spills, which was established in 1992, was 
meant to establish an ”equilibrium” between the needs of the victims of oil spills (being 
compensated for the harm) and the needs of the economic actors (being able to continue 
their activities). The international regime has, however, been challenged. There is a 
constantly increasing array of legal scholars’ work on the international liability 
mechanism2--in particular work that criticizes the regime.3 Indeed, the victims of a recent 
oil spill, the Erika, have tried to escape the international civil liability regime to rely 
instead on the provisions of national criminal law4 or EC waste legislation.5 It is quite 
revealing that victims have been willing to escape the regime that was supposed to “ensure 
that adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer damage caused by pollution 
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from ships”.6 In parallel, the EC legislator has 
questioned the sufficiency of the international civil liability regime, as it has started 
preparing legislative acts of its own.7 One can in fact wonder whether challenging the 
international civil liability regime against the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“HR Convention”) could prove to be a way 
forward, both for the EC regulators as well as the victims of oil spills. It can be seen as a 
concrete example of applying human rights based claims in an environmental case.  
Whereas the civil law and criminal aspects of oil pollution accidents such as Erika have 
been widely covered by legal practitioners and scholars, and while some articles have been 
devoted to the international regime from a critical or a law and economics perspective, 
much less has been said about a human rights approach in this field.  
                                                
1 See e.g. ECHR, Mangouras v. Spain, no. 12050/04, the Prestige case. 
2 De la Rue 1993; Wilkinson 1993, 71; Gauci 1999, 29; Goransson 1999, 345; Wolfrum and Langenfeld 1999; Brans 
2001; Chen 2001; Boyle 2005, 3. 
3 Duruigbo 2000, 65; Le Couviour 2002, 2271; Daniel 2003, 225; Faure and Hui 2003, 242; Ibrahima 2005, 63. 
4 On January 16th 2008, Total SA, Giuseppe Savarese (the shipowner), Antonio Pollara (the handler) and Rina (the 
expert company) were sentenced in solidum to pay indemnities of 192 millions €, plus individual penalties by the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. The judgment, while recognizing the risks inherent to oceangoing vessels, 
reckons Total SA was ‘guilty of imprudence’, from the fact that Total SA did not take into account ‘the age of the 
ship’, (nearly 25 years), and ‘the discontinuity of its technical handling and maintenance’ (Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris, Appeal No. 9934895010). 
5 ECJ, Commune de Mesquer v. Total, Case C-188/07 3rd indent. 
6 See the preamble of the Liability and Fund Conventions: “Convinced of the needs to elaborate a compensation 
and indemnification system supplementary to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage with a view to ensuring that full compensation will be available to victims of oil pollution accidents and 
that the shipowners are at the same time given relief in respect of the additional financial burdens imposed on 
them by the said Convention”. 
7 See the Preamble, recitals 3, 5 and 9 of Commission Proposal on Civil Liability of Shipowners (2005). The 
Commission states in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal (2005, 3): “International schemes only have a 
very limited preventative and dissuasive effect. (…) the almost complete limitation of operator liability. - -  The 
legitimacy of the principle of limited liability is being increasingly contested”. Another example, outside the 
maritime transport sector, is the Directive 2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability, which follows the principle of 
operators' unlimited liability (see page 4) “Modernising these international Conventions will involve revising them. 
The revision process is underway for the 1992 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. The 
Commission intends to work for improvements to be made to this convention, such as removing the ceiling on 
civil liability”) (emphasis added). 
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This paper provides such a human rights focused study. In particular, it questions whether 
the right to property, as enshrined in Article P1-1 of the HR Convention, could be used to 
challenge the limited environmental liability provisions of the international framework. In 
other words, this article analyzes the extent to which the liability scheme set up by the 
international civil liability regime fulfills the human rights requirements of the HR 
Convention, as interpreted by the European Court on Human Rights (“the Court” or 
“ECHR”). The paper will focus on one provision of the HR Convention: Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 (“Article P1-1”), i.e. the right to property.  
The practical starting point of this article is the Erika accident. As noted, some of the 
victims of the Erika accident have attempted to escape the rules of the international 
regime on oil spills, because the regime limits the parties’ right to claim damages on harm 
caused to their property. Yet the findings of the paper do not limit themselves to the Erika 
accident; they are rather meant to bring forth the incompatibility between the 
international civil liability regime and the HR Convention’s requirements regarding the right 
to property.  
Should the international civil liability regime and human rights be considered incompatible, 
there would clearly be a need for a further careful assessment of the consequences. That, 
however, is already beyond the scope of this paper. Nor will this paper go into details 
regarding questions on the hierarchy of norms, or the extent to which the State parties to 
the HR Convention are limited in their discretion in signing and ratifying international 
conventions.  
This paper will first focus on the international civil liability regime. The analysis will then 
move in the third chapter to the HR Convention, more particularly the case law of the 
ECHR relating to the right to property. In Chapter 4, the international law on limited 
liability will be discussed in the context of the human right to property. Finally, the 
analysis will terminate with conclusions in Chapter 5.  
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2  CL REGIME: A LEGALLY LIMITED LIABILITY 
2.1 Overview8 
The international civil liability regime consists, as noted, of two conventions: the 1992 
“Civil Liability Convention” (“CLC”) and the 1992 “Fund Convention”.9 The 1992 
Conventions were adopted in the wake of the Torrey Canyon disaster,10 and they entered 
into force on 30 May 1996. Their primary purpose is to establish compensation for the 
claimants as quickly and as simply as possible.11 The Conventions apply to damage caused 
by persistent oil pollution in the territory12 of a State party.13 Almost all EU Member States 
with a coastline are parties to the international regime.14 
The “first layer” or part of the Regime is the CLC. The CLC sets a channeled15 and strict16 
liability for the damage on the liable person, i.e. the registered owner of the oil tanker 
from which the polluting oil escaped.17 The registered owner of the ship must subscribe 
insurance.18 However, the ship owner’s liability is severely limited, as a list of exceptions 
enables him to be exempted from liability on various accounts.19 Moreover, the owner’s 
liability is limited to an amount proportionate to the tonnage of the vessel: the so-called 
“ceiling”.  
The “second layer”20 of the international regime, the Fund Convention, provides additional 
protection for victims who cannot get full compensation under the CLC.21 The Fund 
compensates for pollution damage that occurred in a State that is member to the Fund 
Convention.22 In 2003, a Supplementary Fund Protocol to the Fund Convention was 
                                                
8 This article is not meant to provide with an in-depth study of the international liability regime. For such an in-
depth study, please see footnotes 2, 3, 67, 68. 
9 Hereinafter, the CLC and Fund Convention refer to the texts as amended in 1992. There are 102 Parties to both 
the CLC and Fund Convention as of 3 August 2009, and there will be 104 Parties by 24 April 2010 (IOPCF, States 
Parties).  
10 In March 1967 the Torrey Canyon, a crude carrier grounded on a reef off the coast of England. About 60,000 tons 
of oil was released and carried onto the shores of England and France.  
11 See the Preamble to the CLC in footnote 6 above.   
12 Including the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone–EEZ. 
13 CLC, art. I, par. 6. 
14 Oosterveen 2006, 245. 
15 Channeling of liability means the process by which the liable person is designated. In other words, there is a 
pre-defined liable person. See Section 2.2.5.  
16 Strict liability means liability that can be established without any fault. 
17 CLC, art. III, par. 4. 
18 Ibid., art. VII.  
19 Ibid., art. III. Explanatory note to IOPCF (2009, 2) establishes: “He (the owner) is exempt from liability under 
the 1992 Civil Liability Convention only if he proves that:   
a) the damage resulted from an act of war or a grave natural disaster, or  
b) the damage was wholly caused by sabotage by a third party, or  
c) the damage was wholly caused by the negligence of public authorities in maintaining lights or other  
navigational aids.”   
20 Oosterveen 2006, 248.  
21 This is usually the case when the damage exceeds the limit of the shipowner’s insurance. For other cases, see 
Fund Convention art. 4. It is worth noting that the fund is not financed by governments, but by contributions from 
persons receiving ‘contributing oil’ in a Member State after carriage by sea (Fund Convention, art. 1, par. 3,). In 
other words, the Fund is financed by the Oil Industry. 
22 While the Fund Convention is attractive to both developing States and industrialized States, one notable 
exception is the United States. It decided in late 1980’s not to join the international regime and rather to develop 
a national legislation on the issue: the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 1990 and the Comprehensive Environmental 
response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).  
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adopted.23 It provides for supplementary compensation up to a level of 1 173 million USD 
per accident.24  
2.2 Six limitations to liability 
There are six major limitations being placed upon the ship owner’s liability to compensate 
for the harm caused by oil spills: the burden of proof is placed on the claimant; the time 
frame for the claims is limited; the limited definition of “damage”; the limited amounts 
available for compensation; the channeling of liability; as well as the rather theoretical 
possibilities for overriding the limitations of liability. They are treated successively in the 
sections that follow below.  
2.2.1 The claimant’s burden of proof 
The CLC, Fund Convention and Supplementary Fund Protocol place the burden of proof on 
the claimant. In other words, the claimant must establish his loss and his entitlement to 
compensation.25 The difficulties are manifold: for example, the proof can require some 
technical knowledge. It can also turn out to be rather difficult to access the information 
needed to establish a cause of action (e.g. when industrial information is protected and 
inaccessible). On the other hand, the level of proof required can be difficult to attain. 
These difficulties are commonly described in legal literature devoted to environmental 
liability matters.  
The claimant can challenge the Fund’s decision before the competent Court, i.e. the Court 
of the State where the damage occurred. The decision of such a Court binds both the Fund 
and the claimant.26 
2.2.2 The time frame  
The time frame within which the claimant must introduce his request is limited. This 
limitation can be very important because in practice some damages are only revealed 
(“consolidated” as some scholars put it) long after the damage was caused. This could 
happen when the pollution’s effects (e.g. pollution of a lake by a noxious substance) are 
fully acknowledged years later, once the time limit for introducing a claim has already 
passed. Hence, it is very important to carefully determine what triggers the temporal 
limitation: is it the occurrence of the pollution, the cause of the damage, the discovery of 
the damage or the moment that the claimant could or should have acknowledged damage? 
In this respect, the CLC reads as follows:27 
 “Rights of compensation under this Convention shall be extinguished unless 
an action is brought there under within three years from the date when the 
damage occurred. However, in no case shall an action be brought after six 
years from the date of the incident which caused the damage. Where this 
incident consists of a series of occurrences, the six years’ period shall run 
from the date of the first such occurrence”  
                                                
23 There have been 24 Parties since 13 October 2009 (IOPCF, States Parties). A separate inter-governmental 
organization was also established: the International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary Fund (‘the 
Supplementary Fund’).  
24 To be more precise, since the SPF entered into force (3 March 2005), the total available amount for incidents 
that occurred after the entry into force has grown to approximately USD 1.173 Million, while the total available 
amount for incidents that took place before the entry into force is approx. USD 211 million (IOPCF, Compensation 
limits) (before the economic crisis). 
25 This is commonly the case under civil liability regimes, as Oosterveen (2006, 251) emphasises. 
26 Fund Convention, art. 7 par. 6. 
27 Art. 8 (emphasis added). 
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We can also underline the time that elapses between the damage, the moment a claim is 
introduced, screened, reviewed and accepted, and the moment when the compensation 
(money) is actually transferred. This is very important because in the case of oil spills, most 
of the claimants had suffered a damage linked with their professional activity. 
The Erika accident, which occurred in December 1999, can be used as an example. On the 
website of the Fund, there is a page dedicated to this accident:  
As at 7 May 2007, 7,003 claims for compensation had been submitted for a 
total of €388 million (£259 million). Some 6,889 claims have been assessed 
by the experts engaged by the 1992 Fund and Steamship Mutual, i.e. 98.4 % 
of all claims presented. Payments totaling €128 million (£80 million) have 
been made in respect of 5,666 of these claims. (…) The total claims arising 
out of this incident by far exceeded the amount of compensation available, 
some €185 million or £125 million. In order to enable the 1992 Fund to 
make substantial payments to claimants, the French Government and the 
French oil company Total SA undertook to pursue their claims only if and to 
the extent that all other claimants were compensated in full, the claim by 
Total SA to rank after the Government's claim. Initially, as a result of the 
uncertainty as to the total amount of the admissible claims, the Fund had 
to limit its payments to a certain percentage of the loss or damage actually 
suffered by the respective claimants. However, as that uncertainty 
diminished, the level of payments for claimants other than the French 
Government and Total SA was increased to 100 % in April 2003.28  
Still on the same page, one can read more than two years later: 
As at 24 September 2008, 7 130 claims for compensation, other than those 
made by the French Government and Total SA, had been submitted for a 
total of €211 million (£201.8 million). By that date 99.7 % of these claims 
had been assessed. Some 1 014 claims, totaling €31.8 million (£30.4 
million), had been rejected.29 
Almost nine years after the accident, some of the claims still had not been screened. 
Around 20 claims have been left unscreened. The payments for the decided cases were 
made as late as four years after the accident.30  
2.2.3 Definition of damage  
The third limitation concerns the definition of “environmental damage”: the broader the 
definition, the wider the compensation. Issues commonly raised by legal scholars refer to 
the constraints inherent to the very nature of environmental damage, and more particularly 
to “pure” environmental (ecological) damage. Should environmental features with no 
                                                
28 IOPCF, Erika (emphasis added). 
29 Ibid.  
30 Since the Erika accident occurred almost 10 year ago, it is rather hard to get data on the number of claims that 
had not been assessed e.g. 5 years after the accident. In comparison, for the more recent (November 2002) oil-
spill caused by the Prestige, a detailed description of the incident and other information is available on the 
website of the IOPCF, a page specifically devoted to the accident (IOPCF, Prestige). As for the level of assessment 
of the claims assessed by French claimants, one can read under “Claims situation”:  
“France: As at 20 August 2008, 481 compensation claims totalling €109.6 million (£104.8 million) have been 
received by the Claims Office in Lorient (…)  
Of the 481 claims submitted to the Claims Handling Office, 92% had been assessed by 20 August 2008. Many of the 
remaining claims lack sufficient supporting documentation and such documentation has been requested from the 
claimants. Four hundred and forty six claims had been assessed for €49.8 million (£47.6 million) and interim 
payments totalling €5 million (£4 million) had been made at 30% of the assessed amounts in respect of 324 claims. 
The remaining claims await a response from the claimants or are being re-examined following the claimants' 
disagreement with the assessed amount. Fifty-four claims totalling €3.7 million (£3.5 million) had been rejected 
because the claimants had not demonstrated that a loss had been suffered due to the incident.” (Emphasis added) 
In other words, 69 months, more than 5 years and a half after the incident, some 40 claims were left unscreened.” 
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economic value, no “utility” for humans, be compensated for? Another question is whether 
clean-up costs should be prescribed even though they are said to be “non-reasonable”.31 
The international regime defines recoverable damage as:  
“(a) Loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting 
from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the 
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited 
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to 
be undertaken;  
(b) The costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures”32  
Hence, the damage must have been caused outside the ship to be recoverable, must have 
been caused by contamination by oil, and must have occurred within the territory of a 
State party.  
As for what is recoverable,33 costs that are admissible for recovery include: clean-up costs 
justified from a technical and scientific point of view; costs of measures aimed at 
preventing or minimizing recoverable damage under the regime as long as they are 
reasonable; property damage as such with the deduction of wear and tear; and losses 
consequential upon damage to property (e.g. loss of income), together with pure economic 
loss (e.g. fishing activities are rendered impossible by the pollution of the sea, guests not 
remaining or not coming to a hotel because the beach is polluted) and environmental 
impact assessments/studies likely to provide reliable and useful information on damage 
recoverable under the regime. As far as “environmental damage per se” (i.e. impairment of 
the environment as such) is concerned, the compensation is limited to the costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement34 actually undertaken or to be undertaken.35 The so-
called “pure ecological damage” (e.g. irreversible loss of biodiversity) is not compensated 
for. 
2.2.4 Compensation: limited amounts, equal treatment  
As mentioned earlier, the amount available to compensate oil-spill victims, whose claim is 
admissible according to the international liability regime, is limited. This begs the question 
of how, concretely, the limited amount will be divided among the claimants. 
A fundamental principle applied by the Fund is the equal treatment of claimants.36 
According to this principle, the claimants are paid the same percentage of their claims, if 
the total amount of admissible claims exceeds the finances available in the Fund. In other 
words, this ‘pro-rating’ exercise means that, “once a risk of ‘overpayment’ becomes clear, 
the Fund must determine the estimated total costs of the incident, and pay only the 
corresponding percentage of their claims”.37 In such a case, governments usually choose to 
“stand last in the queue”. Indeed, their claims usually are of such an amount that small 
                                                
31 This question raises the issue of the intersection between environmental law and economic values, on the one 
hand, and science, on the other hand. 
32 CLC, art. I, par. 6, incorporated by reference in art. 1, par. 2 to the Fund Convention. 
33 Oosterven 2006, 255-60. 
34 On the concept of “reasonable measures of reinstatement”, see the International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Fund 1992 (2005, 10). 
35 Pfennigstorf 1979, 347-448; Brans 1996, 297-304; Sands and Stewart 1996, 290-6; French 2003, 266-8; Burlington 
2004, 77; Ibrahima 2005, 63-72.  
36 Fund Convention, art. 4, par. 5. 
37 Oosterveen 2006, 252. 
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and private claimants would otherwise not receive much of the total available funds. The 
most important point to note for the purpose of this paper is the fact that victims are not 
assured to receive compensation for the whole damage they suffered.  
2.2.5 The channeled liability 
As mentioned earlier, the liability enshrined in the international civil liability regime can be 
considered ‘strict liability’, meaning that no fault is required to trigger the compensation 
mechanisms. Liability is channeled to an identified person: the ship owner.38 Concretely, 
what is at stake here (and what the victims of the Erika spill over tried to escape) is the 
(in)ability to question the responsibility of other maritime actors and to claim for 
compensation from them, once responsibility is established. 
The channeling of the ship-owner’s liability is defined in Article III par. 4 of the CLC as 
follows:  
 “No claim for compensation for pollution damage may be made against the 
owner otherwise than in accordance with this Convention. Subject to 
paragraph 5 of this Article, no claim for compensation for pollution damage 
under this Convention or otherwise may be made against:  
(a) The servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew;  
(b) The pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the 
crew, performs services for the ship;  
(c) Any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer), 
manager or operator of the ship;  
(d) Any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner 
or on the instructions of a competent public authority;  
 (e) Any person taking preventive measures;  
(f) All servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d) 
and (e)” 
The channeling of liability significantly restricts the extent to which the victims of pollution 
may claim compensation from the broad range of actors involved in maritime traffic, which 
limits the money available for compensation (directly or through supplementary 
insurances). Some authors have labeled the channeling of liability the “de-
responsabilization” of “many other persons such as employees, the charterer or other third 
parties (…) Hence, their incentives for [the] prevention [of accidents] are diluted”.39 
2.2.6 Theoretical exceptions  
The sixth limit concerns the limited possibilities to avoid the application of the limited 
liability rules set by the international regime. In this respect, the international civil liability 
mechanism foresees situations that hamper the maritime actors to pretend to have some of 
the above-mentioned limitations applied. In other words, these are the exceptions, limited 
liability being the principle. 
The ship owner cannot pretend to have his liability limited if it is proven (by the claimant 
or any interested party) that “the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or 
                                                
38 See Section 2.1 
39 Faure and Hui 2001, 250; Le Couviour 2001, 138-52.  
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omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result”.40 Similarly and as seen above, it 
follows from the channeled liability that a range of maritime actors cannot be requested to 
compensate for the pollution damage. This limitation can be overridden, and the liability of 
the persons listed in article 3§4 challenged, if “the damage resulted from their personal act 
or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result”.41  
These exceptions to the limitations are nevertheless largely theoretical. Faults committed 
either with intent or recklessly are extremely difficult to prove. There are several reasons 
behind the difficulties. First and foremost, it is commonly recognized by judges and legal 
authors that maritime transport bears intrinsic dangers and risks.42 Second, it is necessary 
to have good technical skills to fully understand the whole chain of causation that 
eventually leads to an oil spill. Will the victims have such a level of knowledge? All in all 
they have to, since they bear the burden of proof. Hence, it is likely that the exceptions to 
the ship owner’s limited liability to compensate are rare.  The impunity of a series of 
maritime actors is quite common.43 
 
                                                
40 CLC, art. 5, par. 2 (emphasis added). 
41 Ibid., art. 3, par. 4 (last sentence). 
42 See, e.g., Terzic (2009, 7, 9). 
43 Please note that searching for a full compensation from the ship owner may be very difficult, because the 
corporate structures (and veil) render the ‘actual’ owner hard to identify. The ‘registered’ owner may in some 
cases be just an ‘ad hoc’ entity possessing nothing else than the vessel that caused the damage. 
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3 HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
3.1 The “human rights approach” to environmental protection 
This paper focuses on the question whether the above described limits, set by the 
international civil liability regime, contradict the fundamental/human right to property as 
interpreted by the ECHR. Before addressing this core question, however, the link between 
environmental matters and human rights needs to be introduced.  
Distinct links between human rights and environmental law (human rights approaches) are 
possible. Many works are devoted to this approach.44 Kristof Hectors, for example, has 
identified four kinds of approaches.45 First, healthy environment can be recognised as a 
pre-requisite to the enjoyment of basic rights. Second, the protection of basic human rights 
may be considered essential to the protection of the environment. The third and most 
recent approach considers that human rights and the protection of the environment are 
indivisible. The human right to a healthy and secure environment is a substantial 
independent human right. Fourth, environmental protection is integrated in other policy 
fields.46 This last approach is the only one not being grounded on the notion of rights.47 This 
paper is based on the second approach, whereby existing human rights apply to 
environmental protection matters. As mentioned earlier, this paper will focus on a specific 
human right--the right to property. Other grounds could have been studied (right to a fair 
trial, right to an effective remedy, etc). This approach is not unchallenged: among others it 
is commonly seen as largely anthropocentric. While it is by no way claimed that this 
approach is “the” approach to be upheld, we will nevertheless use such an approach as it 
may prove effective for testing legally limited liability applied in environmental matters. 
3.2 The European Court on Human Rights48 
The HR Convention states that two kinds of applications may be submitted to the Court. On 
the one hand, Article 33 of the Convention describes Inter-State cases. A State may bring 
another State before the Court, claiming that the latter did not respect the obligations of 
the Convention.49 On the other hand, Article 34 mentions individual applications. These 
applications are brought before the Court by a private person (physical person, legal 
                                                
44 MacDonald 2008, 213-26; Pallemaerts 2008,149-78.  
45 Hectors 2008, 165-75. 
46 Shelton 2002. Firstly, the recognition of a healthy environment as a condition for the enjoyment of basic human 
rights. Secondly, some human rights ground the protection of the environment (the focus is then on procedural 
rights: access to justice, access to the information, public participation). Thirdly, the recognition of an 
autonomous right to a healthy environment.  
48 HR Convention; Sudre 1997; Pettiti, Decaux and Imbert 1999; de Salvia 2003; Charrier 2005; Renucci 2007; Sudre 
2007.  
Berger and Pettiti 2007. ; Manuel sur les droits de l’homme et l’environnement – Principes tires de la 
jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2006, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/DG2/ISBN/COE-2006-FR-9789287159793.pdf; et  
Jean-François Akandji-Kombé, Les obligations positives en vertu de la Convention Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme – Un guide pour la mise en oeuvre de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Précis sur les 
droits de l’homme n°7, 2006, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-FR-HRHAND-07(2006).pdf  
49 These kind of cases are quite exceptional. See ECHR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, no. 5310/71; ECHR, 
Denmark v. Turkey, no. 34382/97; ECHR, Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94. All the cases mentioned in this 
paper are available on the website of the Court (European Court of Human Rights, Search Portal Hudoc).  
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person, NGO, group of private persons) who claims to be the victim of a breach by a State 
of the rights enshrined in the Convention.  
As far as the environment is concerned, one can note that the word environment does not 
appear once in the text of the Convention. The Convention does not have any provisions 
that would expressly cover environmental matters.50 There is no express right to a 
peaceful, healthy and high quality environment. Nevertheless, the Court has elaborated a 
whole body of rules covering environmental issues, relying mainly on the following grounds: 
right to life (Article 2), prohibition of torture (Article 3), right to a fair trial (Article 6§1), 
right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), freedom of expression (Article 10), 
freedom of assembly and association (Article 11), right to an effective remedy (Article 13), 
and protection of property (Article 1 of the first protocol - Article P1-1). The Court has 
interpreted the Convention very dynamically in order to assess matters of environmental 
protection. The Court’s dynamism deserves to be underlined. It has been acknowledged by 
many scholars in all fields covered by the Convention, not only in environmental matters. 
The Court has, for example, used a diverse range of legal sources, as it has not restricted 
itself to literal interpretations of the Convention. It has recently extended the applicable 
sources to international law texts, even where the concerned States are not parties to the 
international treaties in question.51 Finally, the Court has very recently recognised the right 
to a healthy environment.52 
As mentioned above, this paper does not focus on issues of competence. Nevertheless, it 
will briefly elaborate on this point for it can not only answer the question of whether the 
Court can actually review international Conventions setting environmental liability, but also 
illustrate the above-mentioned dynamism of the Court. 
This working paper focuses on the international civil liability regime. In more concrete 
terms, the paper analyzes whether the victims of the Erika oil spill could question before 
the Court the rules contained in the international civil liability regime. In particular, the 
paper considers if the Erika victims can challenge the international civil liability rules as 
they bind France, a party to the conventions in question. Would the Court consider that the 
national (implementing) laws interfere with the fundamental right to property? 
The national measure at stake in this paper would be French law n°94-478, through which 
France becomes a party to the CLC.53 The paper will determine if the French law in 
question falls under the jurisdiction of the Court despite the international nature of the 
civil liability regime. 
As for the jurisdiction of the Court, it may be essential that the interference by the 
national (French) authorities with human rights in fact stems from the substantive content 
of an international norm. It is the content of the international norm, to be applied in the 
national legal order, that would in fact be challenged by the claimant as infringing the HR 
Convention. Does such a national measure fall under the jurisdiction of the Court?  
                                                
50 This can be explained by the fact that the Convention was adopted in 1950. At that time, the priority was to 
build a sustainable peace and to rebuild the economies.  
51 ECHR, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, §§ 60-86 
52 ECHR, Tătar v. Romania, no. 67021/01. 
53 The only article of Law n° 94-478 reads as follows: “Article unique. - Est autorisée l'approbation du protocole 
modifiant la convention de Bruxelles du 29 novembre 1969 sur la responsabilité civile pour les dommages dus à la 
pollution par les hydrocarbures, fait à Londres le 27 novembre 1992, et dont le texte est annexé à la présente 
loi.” 
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To answer that question, one may rely on the text of the HR Convention and the Bosphorus 
case.54 Under the text of the Convention, “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention”.55 As for the notion of jurisdiction, the Bosphorus case reminds us of the 
principle: jurisdiction is primarily of a territorial nature.56  
Before assessing whether the international measure can, as such, be considered to fall 
under the Court’s jurisdiction, it should be established to what extent an international 
norm to which France is a party is binding under the French legal order. Indeed, the French 
Constitution recognizes the primacy of international law over national law.57  
The Court’s jurisdiction when dealing with international law has been confirmed in the 
Bosphorus case58 in the following terms:59  
 “152. The Convention does not, on the one hand, prohibit Contracting 
Parties from transferring sovereign power to an international (including a 
supranational) organisation in order to pursue cooperation in certain fields 
of activity. (…) 
153. On the other hand, it has also been accepted that a Contracting Party 
is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of 
its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a 
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with 
international legal obligations. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type 
of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any part of a 
Contracting Party's “jurisdiction” from scrutiny under the Convention (see 
United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey”.60 
The Court concluded in §154 that a State party to the Convention has to respect the Court’s 
requirements, including the “treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the 
(HR) Convention”.61 
Applying these principles to the Erika case, it can be concluded, firstly, that treaty 
commitments resulting from the CLC are enforced and applied on the French territory, 
                                                
54 ECHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim irketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98; Eckes 2007, 47-67.  
55 HR Convention, Article 1 (Obligation to respect human rights) (emphasis added). 
56 ECHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim irketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, § 136: the text of 
Article 1 requires States Parties to answer for any infringement of the rights and freedoms protected by the 
Convention committed against individuals placed under their “jurisdiction” (see ECHR, Ilaşcu and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 311). The notion of “jurisdiction” reflects the term's meaning in public 
international law (see ECHR, Gentilhomme and Others v. France, nos. 48205/99, 48207/99, and 48209/99, § 20; 
ECHR, Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others [GC], no. 52207/99, §§ 59-61; and ECHR, Assanidze v. Georgia, 
no. 71503/01, § 137), so that a State's jurisdictional competence is considered primarily territorial (see ECHR, 
Gentilhomme and Others v. France, nos. 48205/99, 48207/99, and 48209/99, § 20; ECHR, Banković and Others v. 
Belgium and Others, no. 52207/99, § 59) and the jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised throughout the State's 
territory (see ECHR, Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC],  no. 48787/99 § 312).  
57 Art. 55 of the French Constitution reads as follows: “Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés 
ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de 
son application par l'autre partie.”  
58 ECHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim irketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, §§152-153 
(emphasis added; internal citations omitted). 
59 The Bosphorus case concerned Community law that resulted from international commitments. 
60 ECHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 29. 
61 ECHR, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, § 154 reads as 
follows: “In reconciling both these positions and thereby establishing the extent to which a State's action can be 
justified by its compliance with obligations flowing from its membership of an international organisation to which 
it has transferred part of its sovereignty, the Court has recognised that absolving Contracting States completely 
from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by such a transfer would be incompatible with the 
purpose and object of the Convention; the guarantees of the Convention could be limited or excluded at will, 
thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the practical and effective nature of its 
safeguards. - - The State is considered to retain Convention liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent 
to the entry into force of the Convention. - - ” (Internal references omitted) 
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given the French recognition of the primacy of international law over national law. 
Secondly, despite the international nature of the norm in question and the international 
source of the questioned commitments, the transposing French law 94-478 falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
It can therefore be concluded that the Court would have jurisdiction to consider whether 
French law n°94-478, which transposes in France the provisions of the CLC, would infringe 
an individual’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his or her possessions.  
3.3 Right to property under the HR Convention (Article P1-1)62  
Article 1 of the first Protocol to the HR Convention reads as follows: 
“Protection of property  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law.  
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of 
a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties” 
3.3.1 Property: an autonomous right 
The notion of property is autonomous in the framework of the HR Convention, as 
interpreted by the Court.63 As such it does not depend on the definitions in the State 
parties’ legal orders. The notion of property has been interpreted extensively by the Court: 
the legal definition of property is recognized for almost anything with a patrimonial value, 
as long as there is a “legitimate expectation” that the claim or debt may be realized. 
Nevertheless, the claim must have sufficient grounds in national law.64 Such a condition is 
met e.g. when the patrimonial value is well settled by the national courts. 
3.3.2 The three norms of Article P1-1 
It is settled case law that Article P1-1 contains three norms (rules). The Sporrong and 
Lönnroth v. Sweden case highlights the matter:  
 “61. (…) [t]hat Article (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, 
which is of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment 
of property; it is set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The 
second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain 
conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The 
third rule recognises that the States are entitled, amongst other things, to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by 
enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained 
in the second paragraph. 
                                                
62First Protocol to the Human Rights convention 1952, art. 1.  
63 ECHR, Öneryildiz v.Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 124. 
64 ECHR, Kopecky v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 52; ECHR, Draon v. France [GC], no. 1513/03, § 68, 6 October 
2005; ECHR, Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, § 66. 
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The Court must determine, before considering whether the first rule was 
complied with, whether the last two are applicable”.65  
Even though those three norms are said to be independent, the Court tends to consider 
them together within article P1-1.66 
The first norm establishes the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. It has also been 
labelled “norme floue” (blurred norm), “norme balai” 67 (sweeping norm), or “catégorie 
résiduelle” 68 (residual category) for this first norm seems, at the first glance, to be defined 
negatively. Any national measure that would not fall within the scope of the second or 
third norm would fall within the first norm’s scope. Nevertheless, it is necessary to define 
the first norm positively, since otherwise article P1-1 would “only” and “broadly” consist of 
the second and third norm (i.e. deprivation of possessions and control of the use of 
property). Thus, defining the first norm is essential in order to realize the full potential of 
the whole article. Accordingly, the Court found that the 1st norm applies to expropriations 
where compensation is not determined or if compensation is not actually awarded.69 
Similarly, the Court found that the 1st norm applies when “fluidity” and “uncertainty” are a 
result of the interference and the aim of the questioned national measure.70 
Moving from the 1st norm to the 2nd and 3rd norms, the distinction between the latter two is 
made along two criteria. The first and main criterion is quantitative (the consequence of 
the interfering measure), the second and complementary criterion is qualitative (the aim 
pursued by the interfering measure). The consequence of the deprivation of property 
(second norm) is the definitive and complete dispossession of a right or interest qualified as 
a possession. There is a complete and irreversible rupture in the legal relationship that 
links the possession, the object of the right or of the interest, and the entitled person. On 
the contrary, when some elements of the right that result from the possession are 
interfered with but not left entirely without substance, the interfering measure is qualified 
as control of use of property (third norm). The same applies when the person entitled to 
the right still, after the interference, retains a legal link with the property.  When the aim 
pursued is of general interest, the norm to be applied is the second one, whereas when the 
aim pursued by the interfering measure is part of social and economic policies run by the 
State, the third norm applies.71 Françoise Tulkens has the same reading72 when she 
elaborates that the distinction between the dispossession and regulation of property seems 
to be of a quantitative nature (the degree of interference by national authorities) rather 
than of qualitative nature (the nature of interference by national authorities).  
 
                                                
65 ECHR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, § 61 (emphasis added).  
66 ECHR, James and Others v. UK, 21 February 1986, § 37 (emphasis added).  
67 Sudre 2003, 226-7; Rozakis and Voyatzis 2006, 7. 
68 Allen 2005, 107; Rozakis and Voyatzis 2006, 7. 
69 ECHR, Geraldes Barba v. Portugal, no. 61009/00, §§ 46-47. 
70 This “fluidity” or “uncertainty” criterion is also a feature used for qualifying property (e.g. intangible property) 
(Rozakis and Voyatzis 2006, 12-13). 
71 Vanderberghe 2006, 35. 
72 ECHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, § 160: “ The Chamber shared the Government’s point of 
view - -. It noted that, while it was true that the applicant could not exercise her right of use in terms of physical 
possession as the house had been occupied by the tenants and that her rights in respect of letting the flats, 
including her right to receive rent and to terminate leases, had been subject to a number of statutory limitations, 
she had never lost her right to sell her property. Nor had the authorities applied any measures resulting in the 
transfer of her ownership. In the Chamber’s opinion, those issues concerned the degree of the State’s 
interference, and not its nature. All the measures taken, whose aim was to subject the applicant’s house to 
continued tenancy and not to take it away from her permanently, could not be considered a formal or even de 
facto expropriation but constituted a means of State control of the use of her property. The Chamber therefore 
concluded that the case should be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - - ” 
(internal citations omitted), op. cit. Tulkens (2006, 65-66). 
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3.3.3 The three tests to assess the conformity of national interference with Article 
P1-1 
When assessing national measures against article P1-1 requirements, “Both the ECtHR 
(European Court on Human Rights) and the ECJ (European Court of Justice) have 
repeatedly emphasized that the right to property is not an absolute right, limitations to 
that right can be justified under certain conditions. In its Beyeler judgment,73 the ECtHR 
allowed such limitations on the condition that they pass the ‘lawfulness test’, the ‘general 
interest test’, and the ‘fair balance test’”.74 In other words, the right to property is not an 
absolute right: it can be limited as long as the national, interfering law respects the above-
mentioned three tests.75 
3.3.4 Procedural guarantees in the framework of Article P1-1 
Finally, procedural guarantees also have a role to play: the Air Canada case76 developed 
and specified the procedural requirements for the control of the use of property. Those 
settled requirements are clearly exposed by the Jokela v. Finland case.77  
“Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 contains no explicit procedural 
requirements, the proceedings at issue must also afford the individual a 
reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the responsible 
authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures 
interfering with the rights guaranteed by this provision. In ascertaining 
whether this condition has been satisfied, a comprehensive view must be 
taken of the applicable procedures (…)”.  
This procedural requirement goes together with the positive obligation of the State to take 
measures in order to protect property in cases that arise between private persons (both 
physical and natural persons), i.e. when article P1-1 has a horizontal effect.78 
  
                                                
73 ECHR, Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96. 
74 Schutte 2004, 34, op. cit. Lenaerts and Vanvoorden (2006, 126). 
75 For absolute rights (such as ECHR’s Article 3 – prohibition of torture) to be infringed, the mere interference by a 
state constitutes an infringement of the ECHR requirements. 
76 ECHR, Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, 5 May 1995. 
77 ECHR, Jokela v. Finland, no. 28856/95, § 45, quoted by Tulkens (2006, 87). 
78 ECHR, Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, no. 48553/99, § 96. 
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4 THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE CL REGIME WITH ARTICLE P1-1 OF THE HR 
CONVENTION 
4.1 A prelude - the Pressos case  
The above-mentioned limitations of liability, enshrined in the international civil liability 
regime will be assessed against the requirements elaborated in the context of the HR 
Convention’s right to property. 
As noted, to better illustrate the matter, the paper reflects upon a case of a fisherman who 
conducted his activities along the coast of France (a State party to the Civil Liability and 
Fund Conventions), and who suffered of pollution resulting from the escape or discharge of 
oil from Erika. Could the fisherman reasonably refer his case to the Court on Human Rights 
on the grounds that as France is a party to the international regime in question, the 
international regime applies within the French jurisdiction? The impact of the regime is 
that the fisherman is denied (full) compensation for the harm caused. Will the fact that 
France has signed/ratified the international conventions in question thus lead to an 
infringement of the victim’s right to property, as conceived by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and as interpreted by the European Court on Human Rights?  
In assessing the Erika accident, the Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium 
case (“the Pressos case”)79 could present interesting analogies. The issue at stake was also 
limited liability for maritime claims. 
In the Pressos case, pursuant to a Belgian Act80 on the piloting of sea-going vessels and the 
treaties concluded between Belgium and the Netherlands, merchant ships that enter the 
Scheldt estuary must have on board a pilot with a license issued by the Belgian or 
Netherlands authorities. In Belgium the piloting of sea-going vessels is a public service 
organized by the State in the interest of shipping. In practice pilot services for maritime 
and river navigation are provided either directly by the State or by private companies 
acting under a license.81 The liability of the pilots is determined under Belgian law as 
follows:82  
 “The organiser of a pilot service cannot be held directly or indirectly liable 
for damage sustained or caused by the ship under pilotage, where such 
damage is the result of the negligence of the organiser himself or one of his 
staff acting in the performance of his duties, irrespective of whether the 
negligence in question consists of an act or omission.  
Nor can the organiser of a pilot service be held directly or indirectly liable 
for damage caused by a malfunction or defect in the equipment owned or 
used by the pilot service for the purpose of supplying information or 
instructions to the sea-going vessels. 
(…) The ship shall be liable for the damage referred to in the first 
paragraph. A member of staff [of the pilot service] who, by his act or 
omission, caused the damage referred to in the first paragraph above shall 
                                                
79 ECHR, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995. 
80 Wet 3 november 1967.  
81 Ibid., §§ 9-10. 
82 Section 3 bis in Wet 3 november 1967. 
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be liable only in the event of a deliberately tortuous act or gross 
negligence. 
The liability of a member of staff for damage caused by his gross negligence 
shall be limited to five hundred thousand francs for each incident giving 
rise to such damage”.83 
The applicants in the Pressos case were ship owners, mutual shipping insurance associations 
and insolvency administrators. They claimed that through the above-quoted requirement, 
Belgium imposed on them an excessive burden. It upset the fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of their right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions by exempting the organizer of a pilot service 
from liability for negligence on the part of its staff on the one hand, and by limiting the 
liability of the latter and retrospectively extinguishing without consideration any claims for 
compensation which the applicants may have had against the Belgian State or against 
private companies offering pilot services for casualties occurring before 17 September 1988 
it on the other hand.  
The government claimed that the Act reflected not only financial considerations, but 
concerns that bringing Belgian law in line with the law of the neighboring countries could 
warrant prospective legislation in this area to derogate from the general law of torts. The 
Court concluded that  
“ [The government’s] considerations - - could not justify legislating with 
retrospective effect with the aim and consequence of depriving the 
applicants of their claims for compensation.  
Such a fundamental interference with the applicants' rights is inconsistent 
with preserving a fair balance between the interests at stake. 
In addition the retrospective effect of the Act deprived the applicants of 
their claims for compensation in respect of the damage sustained and 
therefore infringed the second sentence of the first paragraph of that 
Article (P1-1).”84 
4.2 Testing the international civil liability regime against the HR Convention: 
the Erika case  
The first issue to assess is whether the Court would legally define a claim for compensation 
in the framework of the international civil liability regime as a possession. If that is the 
case, it should be next examined whether the Court would consider the French law, which 
imposes limitations on an individual’s enjoyment of such possession, to constitute an 
interference by national authorities. Further, it is possible to assess which norm would 
apply in the case of Erika as well as question the horizontal effect of article P1-1. The 
horizontal effect refers to the applicability of the Article to cases that arise between 
private parties as opposed to a State and a private person. In the latter case, the Article 
would have a vertical effect. 
                                                
83 ECHR, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, § 18. 
84 Ibid., § 43, emphasis added. 
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4.2.1 The legal definition of possession and the horizontal effect of Article P1-1 
As for the legal definition of possession,85 the Court stated in the Pressos case:  
 “The rules in question are rules of tort, under which claims for 
compensation come into existence as soon as the damage occurs. A claim of 
this nature "constituted an asset" and therefore amounted to "a possession 
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 (P1-1).  This provision 
(Article P1-1) was accordingly applicable in the present case" (…)”.86  
In the Erika case the rules questioned are those set by the international civil liability 
regime. This regime establishes a liability mechanism under which, just like in the Pressos 
case, “claims for compensation come into existence as soon as the damage occurs”.87 
Hence, we can deduce that the Court would in the Erika case, mutatis mutandis, consider 
the claim to fall under the legal definition of a possession.  
One could also wonder whether Article P1-1 would apply given the horizontal character of 
the case, i.e. between private persons. As the Court stated in the Sovtransavto case:  
 “As regards the right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, those 
positive obligations may entail certain measures necessary to protect the 
right of property - - , even in cases involving litigation between individuals 
or companies. This means, in particular, that the States are under an 
obligation to afford judicial procedures that offer the necessary procedural 
guarantees and therefore enable the domestic courts and tribunals to 
adjudicate effectively and fairly any disputes between private persons”.88 
Hence, Article P1-1 applies also in horizontal relationships. In other words, the horizontal 
effect does not preclude the application of the requirements of Article P1-1. 
4.2.2 The 1st norm of Article P1-1 (peaceful enjoyment of property) 
Next, it is necessary to determine which one(s) of the three norms (rules) of Article P1-1, 
as exposed above in section 3.3.2, applies in our case.89 This will have important 
consequences for the next steps of the analysis. In the Pressos case, the Court stated:    
“The Court notes that the 1988 Act exempted the State and other 
organisers of pilot services from their liability for negligent acts for which 
they could have been answerable.  It resulted in an interference with the 
exercise of rights deriving from claims for damages which could have been 
asserted in domestic law up to that point and, accordingly, with the right 
that everyone, including each of the applicants, has to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his or her possessions - -”.90 
From this paragraph we can conclude that the first norm would apply in the Erika case, 
because the exemption of liability constituted an interference with the exercise of rights 
deriving from claims for damages that could have been asserted in domestic law. It will 
thus be applied accordingly. 
                                                
85 Possession is an autonomous notion in the context of the HR Convention (see Section 3.4.1).  
86 ECHR, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, § 31. 
87 CLC reads as follows: “Art. III: 1. Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at 
the time of an incident, or, where the incident consists of a series of occurrences, at the time of the first such 
occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by the ship as a result of the incident.”  
88 ECHR, Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, no. 48553/99, § 96 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).  
89 As was explained in Section 3.4.2 above, Article P1-1 contains three norms (rules). 
90 ECHR, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, § 34. 
22  IES Working Paper 3/2009  
 
   
 
4.2.3 The lawfulness test: fulfilled 
In testing the ‘lawfulness’ (or legality), the standards established in the Court’s case law 
regarding the legal basis and quality of the law91 that interferes with the right to property 
(Article P1-1) are essential. In other words, the state’s interference must have a legal basis 
in the national order, and this legal basis must be in line with the norms that are superior 
to it.92 The interfering law must fulfill the following requirements: it must be accessible, 
precise, predictable and clear.93 This set of substantive requirements goes together with a 
third, procedural one: the national legal order must offer the claimant the possibility to 
effectively challenge the state’s interference. The claimant must have access to a 
procedure that enables him/her to defend his/her economic interests. That is the 
procedural side of Article P1-1.94 
Applying the lawfulness test to the Erika case, it may be observed that the interfering law 
n°94-478 was adopted on the basis of the French Constitution’s Article 53.95 Hence, law 
n°94-478 has a legal basis in the national order. Second, the law must be accessible, 
precise, predictable and clear. These requirements are taken as fulfilled as well.  
Third, the procedural requirement of Article P1-1 states that the claimant must be able to 
effectively challenge the interfering regulation. The claimant must have access to a 
procedure that enables him/her to defend his/her economic interests. One may wonder 
whether the international civil liability regime provides such sufficient guarantees. To what 
extent are the requirements of a review, of an equitable confrontation, fulfilled? Is the 
claimant in a position to effectively challenge the measures so as to defend his economic 
interests?96 Nevertheless, as the focus of this paper is not on these procedural aspects, they 
may for the purposes of the present analysis also be considered as fulfilled.  
All in all, the lawfulness test may be regarded successfully passed.  
4.2.4 The general interest test: fulfilled 
Regarding the general interest test (or legitimate aim test), the Court’s control is 
marginal97: it is sufficient for a State to invoke a measure in line with a legitimate policy 
(be it social or economic)98. The state simply needs to ground the interference on a 
reasonable basis. When dealing with the control of the use of property (article P1-1’s 3rd 
norm), the discretion of the Court is even more marginal: any objective satisfying the 
                                                
91 This case-law was developed by the Court in the context of the Convention’s article 8 – right to respect for 
private and family life; article 9 –freedom of thought, conscience and religion; article 10 – freedom of expression; 
and article 11 –freedom of assembly and association. 
92 ECHR, Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, § 81, case quoted by Tulkens 
(2006, 79).  
93 Ovey and White 2006, 360-3. See, e.g., ECHR, Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, § 42. 
94 ECHR, Wittek v. Germany, no. 37290/97, § 55; this aspect will be elaborated in the following section. 
95 Article 53 of the French Constitution reads as follows: “Les traités de paix, les traités de commerce, les traités 
ou accords relatifs à l'organisation internationale, ceux qui engagent les finances de l'Etat, ceux qui modifient des 
dispositions de nature législative, ceux qui sont relatifs à l'état des personnes, ceux qui comportent cession, 
échange ou adjonction de territoire, ne peuvent être ratifiés ou approuvés qu'en vertu d'une loi. Ils ne prennent 
effet qu'après avoir été ratifiés ou approuvés. Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n'est 
valable sans le consentement des populations intéressées.”  
96 ECHR, Wittek v. Germany, no. 37290/97, § 55. 
97 ECHR, James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 45; ECHR, Jahn and Others v. Germany 
[GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, §§ 83, 91; ECHR, Draon v. France [GC], no. 1513/03, § 75, 6 October 
2005; ECHR, Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, § 83. 
98 Granting a license for the sake of economic and technologic development (ECHR, Smith Kline and French 
Laboratories Ltd v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 12633/87), measures ensuring the economic welfare of the state 
(ECHR, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, § 37), social measures 
understood broadly (ECHR, Ollila v. Finland (dec.), no. 18969/91), measures re. public works, land planning and 
the environment, agricultural policy, public health, public security, artistic and cultural patrimony. 
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general interest is sufficient.99 It may be added that the notions of public interest and 
general interest are considered to be the same under the Court’s settled case law.100 
The preamble of the CLC reads as follows:101  
“The States Parties to the present Convention,  
Conscious of the dangers of pollution posed by the worldwide maritime 
carriage of oil in bulk,  
Convinced of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available 
to persons who suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the escape 
or discharge of oil from ships,  
Desiring to adopt uniform international rules and procedures for 
determining questions of liability and providing adequate compensation in 
such cases,  
Have agreed as follows” 
Given the Court’s marginal control, the Court would be expected to consider the measure’s 
goal as expressed in the Civil Liability Convention preamble as fulfilling the general interest 
test.102 
4.2.5 The proportionality test: issues of concern 
4.2.5.1 An overview  
Until the Sporrong case, the Court’s control was limited to issues of legality (lawfulness) 
and legitimacy (general interest). In the Sporrong case, however, the Court clearly 
highlighted important features that have since then become settled in the case law as for 
the “proportionality” (or “fair balance”) test of Article P1-1:103  
 “the Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.104 The search for this 
balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is also reflected in 
the structure of Article 1 (P1-1). 
The Agent of the Government recognised the need for such a balance. At 
the hearing on the morning of 23 February 1982, he pointed out that, under 
the Expropriation Act, an expropriation permit must not be issued if the 
public purpose in question can be achieved in a different way; when this is 
being assessed, full weight must be given both to the interests of the 
individual and to the public interest.”  
In comparison with the legality and legitimacy tests, the Court has more room to operate 
when it applies the proportionality test. The evolution of the Court’s case law has 
consequently been the most significant in this area. It is also clearly the most important 
test in terms of this paper.  
                                                
99 Nature protection: ECHR, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), 18 February 1991, § 48; housing policy: ECHR, Mellacher and 
Others v. Austria, 19 December 1989, § 47; measures fighting drugs traffic: ECHR, Air Canada v. the United 
Kingdom, 5 May 1995, § 42,), as highlighted by Tulkens 2006.  
100 See amongst others ECHR, James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 43; ECHR, Bäck v. 
Finland, no. 37598/97, § 53, op. cit. Tulkens (2006, 70). 
101 See the introduction to the Fund Convention’s preamble in footnote 6.  
102 The Community as a whole does not, however, obtain any direct advantage from the national measure. See 
ECHR, Allard v. Sweden, no. 35179/97, § 52. 
103 ECHR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, §69.. For a similar approach, see ECHR, James 
and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 50. 
104 Internal quote omitted. 
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The intensity of the proportionality requirement varies depending on which of the P1-1 
norms applies.105 Indeed, in respect of the 3rd norm (control of the use of property), where 
the States have a wide discretion in determining a legitimate goal (see above), the Court’s 
control regarding proportionality is rather marginal. The States do enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in asserting that the interference is adequate in light of the purpose to be 
reached. The extent of compensation is not scrutinized in detail. The Chassagnou case106 
revealed the potential of the proportionality requirement in regulating interferences with 
the use of property, however. Even though the state’s measure was found to be legal and 
legitimate, it did not meet the proportionality requirement.107  
On the contrary, when assessing a state’s interference with the right to property against 
the 2nd norm (deprivation of possession and subjecting possessions to certain conditions) or 
the 1st norm (peaceful enjoyment of property), the Court’s control is stronger. 
The Court applies five criteria when it assesses proportionality in the context of Article P1 -
1. First, the severity and seriousness of the state’s interference are analyzed. Second, the 
Court assesses the interests at stake: the seriousness of the measure must be proportionate 
to the defended interests. When assessing the interests, the Court keeps in mind that the 
Convention is meant to protect concrete and effective rights. Hence, the Court must go 
beyond the mere appearances and analyze the concrete reality of each situation that it 
deals with.108  
The third criterion is the harm suffered, together with the possibility to obtain 
compensation. The reasonable compensation requirement itself is assessed against two 
criteria: the compensation must be in line with the value of the property109 and it must 
take place within a reasonable time (hence making a link to the procedural 
requirements).110 As for the value of the property, the Court recognizes that when the 
state’s interference takes place in the context of a political or economic reform, the state 
is entitled not to compensate for the full value of the property. As for the time frame, the 
national courts must take it into account when granting compensation: when the whole 
process of awarding compensation is excessively long, the compensation must be raised 
accordingly. A particularly long delay in paying the compensation does make the financial 
burden heavier and places the victim in a situation of uncertainty.111 In such a case, the 
time between the moment when the compensation was awarded and when it was 
effectuated constitutes a distinct prejudice.112  
                                                
105 Allen 2005, 107, op. cit. Rozakis and Voyatzis (2006, 24). 
106 ECHR, Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 85. 
107 Tulkens 2006, 83. 
108 ECHR, -Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, § 168 and ECHR, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 151: 
“In assessing compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must make an overall examination of the 
various interests in issue, bearing in mind that the Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are “practical 
and effective”. It must look behind appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. That 
assessment may involve not only the relevant compensation terms – if the situation is akin to the taking of 
property – but also the conduct of the parties, including the means employed by the State and their 
implementation. In that context, it should be stressed that uncertainty – be it legislative, administrative or arising 
from practices applied by the authorities – is a factor to be taken into account in assessing the State's conduct. 
Indeed, where an issue in the general interest is at stake, it is incumbent on the public authorities to act in good 
time, in an appropriate and consistent manner - - ”  (Internal citations omitted).  
109 ECHR, James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 54; ECHR, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 
no. 36813/97, § 96. 
110 ECHR, Akkuş v. Turkey, 9 July 1997, § 29. 
111 ECHR, Koçak and Others v. Turkey, no. 42432/98, § 14 
112 ECHR, Günal v. Turkey (no. 1), no. 19282/92, § 30. 
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The fourth criterion to be taken into account is the national law’s lack of clarity, its 
uncertainty. Lack of clarity113 and a wide margin of appreciation left to the public 
authorities will be taken into account by the Court when it assesses whether the law is in 
line with the proportionality requirement.114 The Court has also established e.g. in the 
Papachela case, that if the internal norm is excessively rigid, no account can properly be 
taken of the diversity of the situations. The Court concluded in the Papachela case that the 
internal norm was not proportionate.115 As for the procedural requirements, in the Biozokat 
case116 the Court estimated that since the affected owners had to multiply the procedures 
in order to qualify for compensation, a fair balance was not achieved. 
If the property at stake becomes precarious, the control of proportionality is stricter. 
Uncertainty (a form of precariousness giving ground to the applicability of the first norm, 
see above) is another element considered by the Court in assessing whether or not 
proportionality is respected.117 Uncertainty can be found when an unreasonably long time 
elapses before definitive compensation is awarded118 or before the legal situation of the 
property is clarified. There is also uncertainty when the State does not take measures that 
would effectively protect the property.119 
As the fifth and recently applied criterion, the Court takes the social function of the 
property into account. Mirroring the developments in social welfare case law, the Court has 
developed a body of jurisprudence in the field of possessions that is linked to livelihood 
activities. In the Doğan and Others v. Turkey120 case, the Court recognized the right to earn 
a living by work through the protection of the working means, tools. This right had already 
been recognized in the Lallement case.121 When applying the social function criterion in the 
Alatulkkila case122, Finland was found to have duly taken into account and differentiated 
the modalities of the measure at stake. Attention had been paid to whether or not the 
affected persons’ means of subsistence were at stake or not.  
4.2.5.2 Applying the proportionality test 
A proportionality test of the 1st norm starts by an assessment of the two first criteria123, 
the (1) severity (gravity) of the state’s interference in proportion to the overall (2) 
interests at stake. As noted, the Court must go beyond the mere appearances, and look 
into the reality of how the international liability regime deals with the individual oil spill 
victims.124 This assessment of the Court would very much rely on the fact, the reality of the 
concrete situation. Because of this largely subjective and rather unpredictable outcome 
depending upon al the elements of a concrete situation that we cannot set in a fictive case, 
we will rather focus on the following criteria, which are much more objective and reliable. 
                                                
113 As long as this feature does not constitute unpredictable nor arbitrary interference, and is not qualified as ipso 
facto contrary to the Court’s requirements. 
114 ECHR, Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, §§ 109-110; ECHR, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, §154; 
ECHR, Străin and Others v. Romania, no. 57001/00, § 49; ECHR, Buzescu v. Romania, no. 61302/00, § 92, op. cit. 
Vanderberghe (2006, 44). 
115 ECHR, Papachelas v. Greece [GC], no. 31423/96, § 53; ECHR, Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 15 November 
1996, § 49; ECHR, Tsomtsos and Others v. Greece, 15 November 1996, § 40; ECHR, Biozokat A.E. v. Greece, no. 
61582/00, §§ 28-32. 
116 See Vanderberghe 2006, 44. 
117 Ibid., 25-28. 
118 ECHR, Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, nos. 29813/96 and 30229/96, §§ 54-5 
119 ECHR, Doğan and Others v. Turkey, nos. 8803-8811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02, § 154. 
120 Ibid. 
121 ECHR, Lallement v. France, no. 46044/99, 11 April 2002. 
122 ECHR, Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, no. 33538/96, §§ 66-8. On this issue, see Marguénaud 2007, 665-70.  
123 The Court also scrutinizes the procedural requirements, which are not, as mentioned, the focus of this paper. 
124 ECHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, § 168; ECHR, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 
151.  
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The Court assesses the suffered harm together with the (3) victim’s ability to obtain 
compensation. As was seen above, the interference cannot be proportional when the 
compensation is not reasonable.125 Two further criteria -- (4) uncertainty and (5) social 
function -- restrict the States’ margin of appreciation in setting the compensation. 
Regarding uncertainty, the design and actual functioning of the international civil liability 
regime are assessed by the Court. First of all, as mentioned earlier and as admitted by the 
Fund on its website, some nine years after the Erika spill took place all the claimants still 
had not had their claims screened. Second, the Fund itself recognizes uncertainty about the 
total number of admissible claims. Such uncertainty justified (according to the Fund) a 
limitation of the payments to a percentage of the loss or damage actually suffered. As 
uncertainty diminished the payments were complete by April 2003, that is to say more than 
three years after the accident.126 Thus, the level of compensation is based upon the 
number of admissible complaints, in function of the total amount of money available to 
compensate all the complainants. Based upon all these elements, we can reasonably expect 
the Court to find uncertainty in the way that the international liability regime grants and 
determines compensation.  
As for the social function, victims such as a fisherman or anyone whose has his professional 
activity is hampered by an oil spill can obviously argue that there is particular social value 
attached to the possession. At stake are his working tools and loss of income (be it e.g. 
nets, boats, or pure economic loss suffered because of the pollution of the sea and the 
consequent inability to fish and loss of clients).  
All in all, on the basis of these observations we can reasonably expect that the Court would 
find both uncertainty and that the property has a social function. Therefore, the Court’s 
control would be more stringent than it would otherwise be in the context of article P1-1. 
Bearing in mind the Court’s stringent control, it can next be established whether the 
compensation awarded in the international liability regime is adequate--and hence 
proportionate.  
Compensation is adequate as long as it reasonably reflects the value of the property and is 
awarded within a reasonable time frame. Here, as explained above, we can highlight the 
fact that all complainants have not had their case screened by the fund after nine years. 
Moreover, for those who have had their case screened by the Fund there has been a delay 
in the full compensation because of the limited amounts available. The long process of 
awarding compensation has not been taken into account, nor has the time that has elapsed 
between the award of compensation and its effective payment. Furthermore, claimants are 
not allowed to challenge the liability of maritime actors listed in the Civil Liability 
Convention’s article III §4 on the grounds of common rules of tort, even though this could 
have enabled them to get full compensation for their loss or damage. Finally, the 
compensation mechanism is rigid: no account is taken of the diversity of situations because 
of the equal treatment and pro-rata exercises. Taking into account the wider margin of 
control available to the Court (see above), it seems likely to consider that the 
compensation has not been adequate.  
                                                
125 ECHR, James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 120. 
126 “Initially, as a result of the uncertainty as to the total amount of the admissible claims, the Fund had to limit 
its payments to a certain percentage of the loss or damage actually suffered by the respective claimants. 
However, as that uncertainty diminished, the level of payments for claimants other than the French Government 
and Total SA was increased to 100 % in April 2003” (IOPCF, Erika).  
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Hence, there would be reasonable grounds for the Court to find French law n°94-478, 
which makes the international civil liability regime’s provisions to be applied into the 
national jurisdiction, not to fulfill the proportionality requirement.  
Therefore, it may be concluded that the international civil liability regime, which binds the 
French national authorities, does not fulfill the proportionality requirement in the context 
of the HR Convention’s Article P1-1. The Court would, in other words, consider the French 
law that implements the CLC not to be in conformity with the HR Convention. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discussed grounds to test the compatibility of the international civil liability 
regime for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. We focused on the Human Rights Convention’s requirements contained in 
article 1 of the first Protocol: the right to property.127 The paper does not give clear-cut 
solutions, but rather challenges the international civil liability regime by applying a “human 
rights approach”. An assessment of the compatibility between the two regimes through a 
“proportionality” (i.e. “fair balance”) test, in particular, revealed clear tensions. In this 
respect, it is also worth underlining that the limitations of the international civil liability 
regime have been acknowledged, not only by the European Court of Justice,128 but also by 
other EU institutions in the framework of the third “Erika package”.129 On the other hand, 
when contemplating the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, further points arise, such as the 
EU’s legal personality and the effects if the EU was a party to the international civil 
liability regime. Perhaps more importantly, the European Court on Human Rights has 
recently recognized the right to a healthy environment in the Tătar case.130 If this right is 
further elaborated in future case law, a number of issues could be raised in respect to the 
international civil liability regime, taking into account the competence the Court granted 
itself in the Bosphorus case. Indeed, there could be an overflow of claims against State 
parties to the Human Rights Convention, which applied in their jurisdictions other 
international conventions or EU environmental law that did not meet the Human Rights 
Convention’s requirements. EU and international environmental law may have challenging 
times ahead. 
                                                
127 Other grounds could obviously also be scrutinized (e.g. Article 6 - the right to a fair trial). 
128 See ECJ, Commune de Mesquer v. Total, Case C-188/07. 
129 See footnote n. 7. 
130 ECHR, Tătar v. Romania, no. 67021/01, 27 January 2009. 
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